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Symposium
The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
and its Follow-up: A CriticalView
Reclaiming Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Law
in the Darfur Case
George P. Fletcher* and Jens David Ohlin**
Abstract
According to the authors, the Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur and the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) bring to light two serious deficiencies of the
ICC Statute and, more generally, international criminal law: (i) the systematic
ambiguity between collective responsibility (i.e. the responsibility of the whole
state) and criminal liability of individuals, on which current international
criminal law is grounded, and (ii) the failure of the ICC Statute fully to comply
with the principle of legality. The first deficiency is illustrated by highlighting the
notions of genocide and genocidal intent, as well as that of joint criminal enterprise.
The second is exposed by drawing attention to the uncertainties and ambiguities
surrounding such notions as recklessness and dolus eventualis, and in addition
to the frequent reliance in both international case law and the legal literature
on customary international law and loose concepts such as proportionality.
The authors finally point out that if the ICC tries to operate as a real criminal
court under the rule of law and shows sensitivity to the rights and interests of
the accused, US fears of politicized prosecution will diminish.
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1. Introduction
In the drafting of the Rome Statute, the primary focus of interest was the
protection of victims. This is evident in the Preamble and the stigmatization
of ‘impunity’ as an evil of international affairs.1 Impunity means that
those who deserve punishment escape the rigours of the law. Avoiding
impunity requires that the ICC be able to intervene, under the principle
of complementarity, whenever the national courts are ‘unwilling or unable’
to prosecute.
Treating the avoidance of impunity as a foundational value in the ICC
highlights the difference between international and domestic criminal law
and indicates the relative importance, in the former, of victims’ rights.
Impunity is an evil because it frustrates abstract justiceand the interests
of victimsin seeing justice done. In national systems of criminal law,
the tables are turned. The focal point is not only justice for victims, but
also the protection of criminal defendants against unfair convictions.
No constitution in the world mentions the importance of avoiding impunity
for criminal defendants or the importance of protecting victims. They
quite rightly stress the rights of the criminally accused in the face of major-
itarian excess.
It is understandable that in its founding phrase, the ICC would reflect
the interests of international lawyers and that the rhetoric of international
justice would favour the prosecution over the defence. Now that the Court
has begun its initial investigationsand the Security Council has referred
the Darfur atrocities to the Courtwe should witness a shift of focus from
the interests of international lawyers toward the values of criminal lawyers
and their commitment to fair trials. In the process, we may discover some
serious shortcomings of the Rome Statute that have not yet received adequate
attention.
Some advocates of the ICC might think an international court is exempt
from the due process and legality guarantees that guide national trials. But
this would be a major misconception of the task and purpose of international
criminal justice. The long-range value of the ICC is that it will teach countries
of the world how to do justice as they seek to apply repressive measures in
name of social protection. If the ICC deviates from the principles of due process
and legality, it will become a teacher that will bring great harm to the world.
The ICC must not only conform to the rules of fair trial; it must also exceed
conventional practices of the nation states and set a model for the world of how
a criminal court should function.
We do not assert in this commentary that international criminal law should
be treated identically to domestic criminal law. There are, of course, relevant
1 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble (‘Determined to put an
end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention
of such crimes’).
540 JICJ 3 (2005),539^561
differences, chief among them the unique history of international criminal law.
Born from the ashes of 20th-century atrocity, international criminal law
emerged as a response to impunity for the greatest crimes that had escaped
the reach of the law. As such, it is a nascent legal enterprise. But one cannot
defend its shortcomings by asserting that adherence to these principles would
be too difficult.We assert that international criminal law, insofar as it aspires
to be not just international law, but criminal law as well, must remain faithful
to some basic principles of fairness and legality. The rationale for this assertion
is that these basic principles are morally required in any true system of
criminal law, regardless of its structure and irrespective of whether it is
constituted at the municipal or international level.2 The demands of fairness
are constitutive of the rule of law itself, and insofar as international criminal
law seeks to extend the rule of law to atrocity and crimes against humanity,
it too must remain faithful to the demands of fairness. Furthermore, there
is no reason to believe that a more rigorous criminal law at the international
level will not be successful in achieving justice and ending impunity for
atrocity.
In this brief comment on the Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur and the Security Council referral of the Darfur suspects to the Office
of the Prosecutor, we shall focus on two serious deficiencies of the Rome
Statute. The first is the systematic ambiguity about collective versus individual
responsibility. The historical transition from the Geneva Conventions to the
Rome Statute also signalled an under-theorized shift from state and communal
responsibility to the prosecution of individuals for the same actions that
were previously the basis for state responsibility. This is far more serious than
a simple procedural reorientation. An analysis of the Rome Statute, more
searching and critical than that found in the standard commentaries, reveals
a serious conceptual deficiency about the role of collective action in defining
the crimes subject to prosecution. In part one, we explore these ambiguities,
particularly as applied to the charge of genocide and in light of the debate
about the evidence in Darfur.
Even more serious from the standpoint of criminal lawyers is the legality
deficit that pervades the Rome Statute and the emerging ICC. Although the
Rome Statute is the most specific statutory source for international criminal
law enacted to date and includes provisions respecting the principle of legality
that extend far behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Statutes, these protections remain unconsummated. The International
Community appears to commit itself to the principle of legality in Article 22
2 At least since Fuller, it cannot be denied that laws must be general, public, prospective, clear
and consistent. See L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1964). H.L.A. Hart offers a similar account of the rule of law in The Concept of Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). These criteria of the ‘inner morality of law’ apply equally,
whether or not the rule of law is established by international institutions or domestic
penal systems.
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of the Rome Statute. Yet, as indicated by some of the arguments used
in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the community of
international lawyers has yet to understand the full implications of legality
in criminal cases. As we argue in Section 4, a proper understanding of
legality should lie at the cornerstone of the inevitable shift from the influence
of the drafters of the Rome Statute to the legitimate functioning of the ICC as
a criminal court.
2. Collective Action and Individual Responsibility
A. Implications of Individual Responsibility at the ICC
The imminent prosecution of suspected authors of international crimes before
the ICC represents a fundamental shift from international law to criminal law.
Although these concepts have been blurred together through the formation
of international criminal law, it is important to remember that the source
of this nascent enterprise is two disciplines with distinct goals. Historically,
international law aimed its direction at the collective level, i.e. at the actions
of nations and states, their interactions and their peaceful coexistence.
When there was adjudication, it was directed at the collective level, where
states were criticized for their collective illegal conduct under international
norms, either through treaty or custom. Punishments for collective crimes
included sanctions, reparations and loss of international comity. Criminal law,
however, aimed its gaze at the individual, attributing legal responsibility
for individual culpability and punishing offenders on that basis. Historically,
criminal law was pursued by domestic officials only under domestic statutes.
The emergence of modern international criminal lawculminating in the
creation of the ICCbrings these two historical strains of legality together.
While this convergence seems natural and desirable, a failure to appreciate
these distinctions has produced a conceptual muddle.
Indeed, the distinction can be seen in the very authorization of the inter-
national tribunals. The Security Council authorized the ad hoc Tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwandaas well as its referral of the Darfur situation to
the ICCpursuant to its Chapter VII authority to restore international peace
and security. This is a paradigmatic example of classic international law at
the collective level, i.e. the need to adjudicate disputes and restore the balance
of peaceful relations between international collectives. But the resulting
prosecutions at the ICC must, by definition, take place at the individual level.
While nations can, under specific circumstances, be brought before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and hit with sanctions by the Security
Council, it is only individuals who can be brought before the ICC and punished
for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.3 The whole argument
3 The court’s jurisdiction is explicitly limited to ‘natural persons’. See Art. 25(1) Rome Statute.
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for the Security Council’s intervention, if it is to be taken seriously, is that
individual criminal responsibility is a pre-condition for resolutions at
the collective level of international law. Only justice at the individual level
will yield peace and security at the collective level. Or so the legal
structure suggests.
Individual and collective responsibilities intersect in cases where individuals
act under colour of state law with official state complicity. The allegations
presented in the Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur enumerate
several instances where militia groups were said to act in conjunction with
military officers exercising official state discretion. In such a case, there may
be liability at both the individual and state levels. If the state itself is involved in
the criminality, it may face the appropriate consequences under international
law. But it is crucial to remember that during an ICC criminal prosecution,
only the individual will be punished. The defendant alone will serve the jail
time. It is for this reason that we urge fidelity to basic principles of criminal
law that ensure that defendants are punished only for crimes that they
are personally responsible for, as opposed to crimes of state. For these crimes,
the state as a whole bears ultimate responsibility.
We must remember that international law and criminal law are two
fundamentally different strains of law and that different doctrines apply to
each. Individual criminal responsibility, whether pursued at the municipal
or international level, must be adjudicated with the same serious commitment
to legality. The international criminal justice system exists not because it is
a higher form of justice, but simply to prosecute individual perpetrators
when they act with municipal impunity. Impunity occurs when a state
is unable to mount a prosecution, as might be the case with a collapsed
government that has devolved into anarchy, or actual government complicity
in the criminality, as is alleged in the case of Sudan. Regardless of the alleged
government complicity, however, it must remain clear that the subjects of an
ICC prosecution are individuals standing trial for their individual crimes.
To prosecute an individual for the crimes of his state is to engage in impermis-
sible collective punishment, and is a nasty throwback to a time when the
romantic notion of blood guilt was confused with criminal adjudication.
Criminal justice must stand or fall on the backs of individuals.
Specifically, the problems associated with this conceptual confusion can
be seen in the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry. For example,
the Report details a lengthy list of international human rights instruments
and alleges wide-scale breaches of these human rights commitments in the
Darfur region.4 Although the Commission was required by its mandate from
the Security Council to discuss Sudan’s violation of international human
4 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary-General, at 41^44 (discussing Sudanese responsibilities under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
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rights law, these allegations are nonetheless irrelevant and potentially
prejudicial for the ICC prosecutions. Individuals are prosecuted for violations
of statutory or treaty-based criminal rules. The human rights instruments are
agreements between states to adhere to international standards in their
domestic state conduct. But they were not envisioned as a basis for individual
criminal liability, nor are they required for that purpose. Indeed, the guiding
spirit of the Rome Statute negotiations was to provide a basis for criminal
liability and to fill a vacuum created by international law’s focus on collective
responsibility and the purely domestic character of criminal law. The fact that
Sudan continues to violate human rights standards only serves to prejudice the
outcome of an individual’s trial.
Nor is it necessary to appeal to human rights law to guide interpretation of
the Rome Statute. For example, Article 7 of the Statute defines crimes against
humanity with sufficient clarity and precision, including murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, torture, rape, etc., and there is no need to appeal to human
rights law to unpack these relatively straightforward criminal concepts.
Indeed, if there is any place to look for relevant illumination, it is domestic
criminal legal systemsall of which make use of these primary concepts.
Furthermore, appealing to international human rights law for interpretation
only increases the possibility that criminal defendants will be subject to
greater personal liability than envisioned by the Rome Statute. This is
explicitly prohibited byArticle 22(2).5
The degree of Sudan’s violation of international human rights law is a
question of collective responsibility for the entire nation, and one best suited
for adjudication before the international bodies designed for that purpose. It
has little bearing on the individual responsibility of individual actors indicted
and standing trial before the ICC. To suggest that the former is relevant for
the latter is to punish the individual for the crimes of his nation as a collective
or, by association, for the actions of other citizens in the same nation.
Unfortunately, this appeal to international human rights law is not the only
area where the current legal doctrine is insensitive to the distinction between
collective and individual responsibility. The confusion can be seen in two other
areas of international criminal law: the crime of genocide and the doctrine of
joint criminal enterprise, which allows prosecution of individual members for
the common criminality of an entire group. One must be careful here to ensure
that the doctrine punishes group conduct where individuals are bona fide
participants, as opposed to cases where individuals without the appropriate
mens rea are prosecuted for group crimes. Insofar as the doctrine mirrors
the doctrine of conspiracy in domestic criminal law, our position confronts
not just international criminal law, but US criminal law as well, which
has long relied on an overbroad doctrine of conspiracy. These issues will
be the subject of section 2C. But before analysing the deficiencies of joint
5 According to Art. 22(2) Rome Statute, ‘The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and
shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted’.
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criminal enterprise, we consider the law of genocideanother area where
the confusion of collective and individual responsibility is evident in the
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry.
B. The Collective Nature of Genocidal Intent
The dialectic between individual responsibility under criminal law and
collective responsibility under international law becomes most pressing when
the crime in question is genocide. Indeed, the definition of the crime itself
places it at the intersection of collective and individual responsibility, and
we urge a careful consideration of this nexus when attempting to attribute
criminal responsibility for this crime.
Genocide is both collective and individual. It is collective in the sense that
both the perpetrator and the victim are groups.While scholarly attention has
focused on the collective nature of the victims, and indeed catalogues the
kinds of groups (including racial, ethnic and religious groups) that can be
victimized by genocide,6 less attention has been paid to the collective nature
of the perpetrators. Genocide is not merely one individual seeking to annihilate
an entire ethnic group. History teaches us that genocide is the attempt to wipe
out an ethnic group by another ethnic group. It is for this reason that genocide
brings strong collective shame and guilt to a nation that has perpetrated it.
Indeed, this shame and collective guilt may very well persist even after the
individuals involved have passed from the scene.
Despite this collective aspect to the crime of genocide, the international
law of war since Nuremberg, including Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and now
Sudan as well, represents an attempt to hold individuals accountable for a
collective action. But accomplishing this task has been insufficiently theorized
at two levels. The first is the objective element, when it is clear that many
individuals may have participated in small ways. The second is the subjective
element of genocidal intent.We consider both in this article.
The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry concludes that
there was no genocide in Sudan because there was no genocidal intent at the
collective level, i.e. the government of Sudan was allegedly motivated by a
desire to engage in a counter-insurgency campaign, possibly at the expense
of civilians, but was not motivated by a desire to annihilate an ethnic group.7
6 There are, of course, well travelled academic debates about what kinds of groups can be the
object of genocide. The 1948 Genocide Convention defined genocide as applying to national,
ethnic, racial or religious groups, although several commentators have noted that this list
excludes some obvious candidates, such as political groups and tribes. The restrictive reading
of genocide by the convention posed some obvious difficulties during the Rwandan
prosecutions at the ICTR, given the uncertain ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi
populations. But we need not resolve such questions here.
7 See Report of the International Commission, at 130^131 (concluding that while objective
elements of the offence of genocide were present in Sudan, the subjective element was missing).
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Nonetheless, the Report concedes that some government individuals may
have acted with individual genocidal intent. This raises the question of how
one attributes genocidal intent to the group, since evidence of intent will
almost always be found at the individual level. The scholarly literature’s failure
to deal with these problems represents a fundamental lack of theoretical
engagement with the relationship between individual and collective responsi-
bility, and the distinction between moral guilt and criminal adjudication.
It is within this context that the collective and individual elements of
genocide are frequently confused, preventing a conceptually clean analysis.
The problem is not only the confluence of individuals and groups, but also
the emergence of different kinds of groups. We have already argued that the
historical paradigm of genocide is the clash of embattled groups, i.e. the
attempt by one ethnicity to wipe out the population of another group. While
it may be theoretically possible for one individual to engage in a genocidal
attack, there is no reason to think that such a mass murder would be one
of ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole’.8
Although our conception of genocide accords with both the common-sense
understanding of the term and the understanding of historians, it is widely
out of step with the Rome Statute’s treatment of the offence. Under the lan-
guage of Article 6 of the Rome Statute, a simple murder ‘committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’
qualifies as genocide. But it is clearly overbroad to call these kinds of attacks
genocide. While certainly they are horrendous and demand punishment,
the Rome Statute’s classification of them as genocide flies in the face of the
historical paradigm, where an ethnic group proclaims its superiority over
another and seeks its annihilation. But under the Article 6 paradigm, almost
any hate-crime murder would qualify as genocide, since racist fanatics usually
seek the destruction of the ethnicity they despise. While these murders are
undeniable criminal, one should not trivialize genocide by including it in
such company. In cases recognized by history as true genocide, the ethnic
group as a whole carries the intention to destroy.
Genocide is, by definition, a collective endeavour, yet international criminal
prosecutions seek punishment of individual perpetrators. It is perhaps for
this reason that in the law of genocide, we see the emergence of three groups.
One group is the ethnic perpetrator, the second group is the ethnic victim,
and the third group is the smaller group engaged in the common criminal
purposethe military unit, the militia or the gangcontemplated by
the Rome Statute’s Article 25(3)(d), the statutory surrogate of joint criminal
enterprise. The addition of the third group to the analysis comes in as a
concession to the realities of prosecuting individuals under international
criminal law.
8 See Art. 5 Rome Statute.
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The transition from the collectivized international law of nations to the
individualized criminal law of the ICC requires this conceptual move. It would
be folly to attribute criminal responsibility to an entire ethnicity, although
one of us has argued in the Storrs Lectures that it may still be necessary
to attribute collective guilt to an entire ethnic group.9 But moral guilt and
criminal responsibility are distinct concepts, with their own internal logic.
Moral guilt might be attributed to an entire nation when that nation has
engaged in egregious historical wrongs, such as launching an aggressive war
without cause or persecuting a minority. Citizens of the nation might bear
a piece of that moral guilt insofar as they belong to the nation, even if they
did not individually approve of the programmes and policies in question.
Indeed, such might be the case where nations are lead by dictators without
democratic legitimacy. Just as a citizen can take pride in the praiseworthy
accomplishments of his nation, so too the citizen can be shamed by the moral
wrongs of his nation. It is in this sense that an entire nation can be the subject
of collective moral guilt.
But this notion of collective moral guilt must be distinguished from
the notion of criminal responsibility. Nations are not the subject of criminal
lawindividuals are targeted for trial and punishment. However, interna-
tional criminal law deals with the categories of crimes frequently associated
with the collective moral guilt of nations: crimes against humanity, war
crimes and genocide. These crimes are rarelyif everaccomplished on an
individual level. It is perhaps for this reason that international criminal law
has become so focused on the law of conspiracy and the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise. In order to make the project of international criminal
justice possible, crime is prosecuted relative to a discrete group engaged in
the kind of common criminal purpose that one associates with a specific
conspiracy. International criminal law has oriented itself toward these discrete
smaller groups precisely because the larger groupsnations and states
cannot be the appropriate objects of criminal responsibility.
This switch in focus from the nation as a whole to the discrete smaller
groups that are the subject of joint criminal enterprise has the potential to
create conceptual difficulties along the way. The issue of genocidal intent will
become a central question when adjudicating whether genocide occurred in
Darfur. It seems intuitively clear that genocide occurs when an entire ethnic
group, say a nation or a people, attacks another ethnicity with genocidal
intent. But the judges at the ICC will most likely look to the intent of the
smaller collective engaging in the common criminal purpose, i.e. whether
they formulated specific military plans with the intent to destroy an ethnic
group. This switch in focus to the smaller group is perhaps inevitable given the
language of Article 23(d). In performing such an analysis, we must remember
that the intent of the smaller group really stands in as a proxy for the intent
9 See G.P. Fletcher, ‘Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, 111 Yale Law
Journal (2002), at 1526^1527.
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of the larger collective when the crime in question is genocide. Although
the criminal planning envisioned by the Rome Statute may occur at the level
of active military operations, through a joint criminal enterprise by military
officers and militia leaders, the ethnic hatred at the heart of genocide stems
from the intent of nations. But, as we demonstrate in the following section,
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise presents its own complications.
C. Collective Responsibility and the Question of Joint Criminal Enterprise
The classic answer to these questions was the law of conspiracy, which
has found its way into modern international criminal law through the doctrine
of joint criminal enterprise. The doctrine applies to a defendant who partici-
pates with a plurality of persons to form a common plan or design to commit
an international offence. In this section, we offer two criticisms of the Report’s
reliance on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. First, the doctrine as
it was applied at the ICTY is inapplicable to the Darfur prosecutions because
the Rome Statute’s language has effectively replaced it. Secondly, the doctrine
itself is substantively overbroad and transgresses basic principles of legality
that limit punishment to personal culpability. Consequently, we urge revision
of the doctrine.
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is most useful for the prosecution
in situations where two individuals belong to the same collective enterprise,
with a common criminal purpose, but only the second one commits the
criminal harm in question. But, for whatever reason, prosecution of the
first alone is considered an insufficient response. Perhaps the first offender is
unavailable or otherwise not subject to conviction. Or perhaps the first can be
convicted, but the prosecution regards the second as equally culpable.
Joint criminal enterprise represents a broad theory of complicity. It permits
the prosecution of one individual for the crime of a second individual, even if
the first did not have the intention of aiding the second and even if the first is
unaware of the second’s existence. It is clear from the Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry that the ICC prosecutions for Sudan will rely heavily
on this doctrinal move. But on what basis is it legitimate to attribute intent
to the whole collective? The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is the law
of conspiracy dressed up in the jargon of modern economic activity. Joint
enterprises were thought to be the Communist path to economic collaboration
with the West. Now the West has appropriated the term and its prestige to
impose a dubious form of criminal liability.
The history of the doctrine is one of judicial creativity. The ICTY developed
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in response to the ICTY Statute’s
requirement that criminal liability could only be imposed in cases where
the defendant ‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted’ in criminal activity (Article 7(1) ICTYSt.). However, the doctrine
as developed inTadic¤ was markedly expansive. Individuals were subject to equi-
valent liability for the foreseeable criminal acts of their fellow conspirators,
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even if the criminal act was not part of the common plan. Unable to ground its
argument in the language of the statute, the Tadic¤ court claimed that this
version of joint criminal enterprise was ‘implicit’ in the ICTY Statute and rea-
soned from the statute’s stated object and purpose of extending jurisdiction of
the tribunal to those responsible for serious violations of international law in
the formerYugoslavia.10 The Court also relied heavily on the role of conspiracy
in war crimes prosecutions dating back 50 years.
We argue that the ICTY’s formulation of joint criminal enterprise has
largely been displaced by the passage of the Rome Statute, which, unlike the
ICTY Statute, includes a specific provision, setting forth the contours of
vicarious liability. Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute imposes liability on
members of groups that act with a common criminal purpose.11 But the
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry demonstrates that despite the
Rome Statute’s Article 25(3)(d), the ICTY doctrine of joint criminal enterprise
survives. The Report cites Tadic¤ approvingly and relies heavily on the case
law developed during the ICTY trials. The doctrine is likely to be central
during the ICC prosecutions, because the Report identifies six members of
the Sudanese government, including military officers and ‘high officials of
the central Government’, who are suspected of engaging in joint criminal
enterprises.12
We contend that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as developed in
Tadic¤ should have limited application before the ICC, which is governed by
the Rome Statute’s Article 25(3)(d)a more precise statutory provision than
the judicially created doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. The language of
Article 25(3)(d) includes no reference to ‘foreseeable criminal acts’ but does
require that the contribution to the criminal plan be ‘intentional’. But, in fact,
all that has to be intentional is the act of doing something that constitutes
a contribution, e.g. selling gas to those who are driving to the scene of the
intended massacre. The culpability nexus between the contribution and the
ultimate criminal harm is left vague. The contributor might have the aim of
furthering the plan (Article 25(3)(d)(i)) or simply have knowledge of the group’s
intention (Article 25(3)(d)(ii)), i.e. if the gas station attendant knows of the
group’s criminal objective, he is guilty for ‘intentionally’ selling them gas.
In the final analysis, the knowledge requirement would be sufficient because
no one could have the aim of furthering the group objective without also
having knowledge of that purpose. The American case law is clear that
10 See Judgment,Tadic¤ (IT-94^1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, x189.
11 Article 25(3)(d) Rome Statute establishes criminal liability for intentional actions that
contribute ‘to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose’. The action must also meet one of two criteria: ‘[b]e made with
the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’;
or ‘[b]e made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’.
12 See Report, x542.
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merely being a contributor with knowledge of a conspiracy’s criminal purpose
is insufficient for liability.13 The Rome Statute should be no less demanding.
There is no case law interpreting the language of Article 25(3)(d) because
there has never been a prosecution before the ICC. The issue is therefore one
of first impression.We object to the criminal prosecution of an individual based
on a theory of liability not found in the Rome Statute but found in a case law
interpretation of the ICTY Statute. This practice illustrates the legality deficit
discussed in greater detail in Section 3. Should the international community
of lawyers prefer the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as developed at the
ICTY, perhaps the Rome Statute should be amended.
Our second criticism of the Report’s reliance on the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise goes to the substance of the doctrine itself. The doctrine explicitly
renders all parties of a conspiracy equally responsible for the criminal acts of
the group, regardless of their individual ‘role and function in the commission
of the crime’.14 This interpretation of the doctrine clearly violates the basic
principle that individuals should only be punished for personal culpability.
By ignoring all relevant differences between members of a conspiracy, the
doctrine erases the moral distinctions between, say, the architects of a serious
crime and those whose participation was merely peripheral. To ignore
these distinctions is to trample on the basic moral principles that provide
the foundation for criminal liability and punishment. Individuals should only
be punished relative to their individual culpability.
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise also falters insofar as it imposes
strict liability for criminal acts that were not part of a common plan. This
version of the doctrine is applied in cases where it was foreseeable that mem-
bers of the conspiracy might perpetrate the criminal act, even if it was not
agreed upon in advance. As any good lawyer knows, virtually any conse-
quence can be characterized as foreseeable. This unwarranted extension of
the doctrine goes to the heart of the confusion between collective and indivi-
dual responsibility. Individuals must be prosecuted for their own actions. If an
individual is to be punished for a group conspiracy, liability must be limited to
the criminal purpose or plan that was agreed to by the participants. Naturally,
these deficiencies in conspiracy law can also be found in many municipal legal
systems, including many jurisdictions within the United States. Both munici-
pal law and international criminal law might benefit from greater clarity with
respect to the distinctions between collective and individual culpability and
the interaction between them. A more restrictive doctrine of conspiracy would
remain faithful to the internal moral logic of the rule of law. Given that the
judges of the ICC will be interpreting the Rome Statute with fresh eyes, and
ought to be unrestricted by ICTY case law, we urge restraint and conceptual
clarity as they formulate and apply an international law of conspiracy.
13 See United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940), affirmed 311United States Reports (US)
215 (1940); United States v. Blakenship, 970 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1992).
14 See Report at x 540.
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3. The Legality De¢cit
Both international law and modern codified criminal law are offshoots of
the Enlightenment. The universality of the human condition and the equality
of all persons nourish the international field of human rights and ultimately
the genesis of new crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity,
designed to protect all persons and ethnic groups. The criminal law represents
a different strain of enlightened values. The principle of legalitythe idea that
all crimes should be legislatively defined prior to their commissionbespeaks
respect for different value systems among potential perpetrators and a recog-
nition, as well, that the zeal of criminal prosecution requires disciplined
restraint. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, as reflected in Article 22 of
the Rome Statute, codifies this concern by requiring fair notice to potential
offenders that their conduct will trigger criminal punishment. It also imposes
discipline on the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC by insisting that
they justify criminal indictments and convictions by appealing directly to the
language of the Rome Statute.
Despite this nominal commitment to legality in the Rome Statute, the rest
of the Statute, the practice of the ad hoc Tribunals and the arguments of
international lawyers reveal a significant ‘legality deficit’. They contain many
features that fall short of what we expect under the rule of law in a domestic
legal system. Most clearly inconsistent with the principle of legality is
punishment by analogy. The former Soviet Union and the Third Reich were
subjected to repeated attacks for permitting punishment by analogy. This
means, essentially, that the governing statutes prescribe punishment, say, for
one way of committing the offence and then permit the courts to punish
for conduct that is equally bad and similar to the cases actually prohibited.
So, for example, if the statute punishes forcible genital intercourse as rape,
it would be punishment by analogy to punish forcible oral copulation as rape
or the equivalent offence. If the latter is illegal, it should be included in
the Statute.
Punishment by analogy is evident in the structure of crimes against
humanity, e.g. in Article 7(1)(k), which authorizes the Court to extend liability
to any ‘inhumane conduct of a similar character’. Another provision is
Article 7, which punishes various sexual offences ‘or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity’ (Article 7(1)(g)). These are classic examples of
punishment by analogy. The basic approach is to take the specified offences
and inquire whether the unmentioned offences are sufficiently similar and
sufficiently evil to warrant punishment. A problematic example under the
just-mentioned provision punishing rape and other acts of sexual violence
is female circumcision. This seems to be a crime of sexual violence, but is
the widespread or systematic practice of female circumcision a crime against
humanity under Article 7? No one quite knows.
The legality deficit in the Rome Statute should concern us not only because
we do not have an answer to the question of what is punished and what is not,
but also because we aspire to an international criminal court under the rule
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of law. The standards of legality must be just as high as they are in the
United States or in any democratic country.
When there is a legality deficit in a criminal regime, you can assume
this deficit exists to serve the interests of the prosecution. There is little doubt
that a pro-prosecution mentality pervades the Rome Statute from the
Preamble, stressing the suffering of the victims, to the abolition of the statute
of limitations (Article 29). Typically, a criminal statute provides for a strict rule
of interpretation in order to protect the interests of the accused. The freedom of
all citizens depends on their knowing in advance what will be punished and
what will not be. The interpretation should therefore favour the accused.
It should reflect the principle in dubio pro reo. The scales of justice in criminal
law are clearly slanted in favour of the accused. The Rome Statute nominally
concurs with this principle in Article 22(2) by requiring strict interpretation
of the definition of crimes. But, as we have seen, the other provisions of the
Rome Statute violate this requirement by encouraging punishment by analogy.
Also, Article 21(3) mandates that the interpretation of the Statute should
‘be consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. Though this
phrase obviously refers to the rights of the accused, it can also be read to
include the rights of the victims, which opens the door to a more aggressive
mode of prosecution.
The Statute does provide one significant deviation from governance by stat-
utory lawa departure that serves the interests of the accused. According to
Article 31(3), the Trial Chamber may recognize new claims of justification and
excuse, so far as they are supported by comparative legal research into diverse
national legal systems. This power of the ICC is perfectly consistent with the
principle of legality because the defendant is entitled to warning of only those
elements that might lead to his conviction. Engaging in creative refinements of
the ‘grounds excluding criminal responsibility’ stands in the tradition of the
great European criminal courts, notably the German Supreme Court, which,
in 1927, became the first court in the world to recognize a general principle of
necessity as a justification.15
In order to see how the ‘legality deficit’ might influence the Darfur
prosecutions, we need to pay closer attention to the charges. In all cases of
mass killings and suffering, the central crime of violence is always the killing
of civilians. Whether this is captured as a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(i)
(‘wilful killing’), or as a widespread or systematic crime against humanity
under Article 7(1)(a) (‘murder’), the basic crime is the same. A member of an
armed squad kills people who are minding their own business. Depending on
the nature of the armed squad and the linkage with an armed conflict
as well as the widespread or systematic nature of the killingthis would
15 Judgment of the German Supreme Court, 11 March 1927, 61 RGSt. 242. An English translation
of the case can be found in G.P. Fletcher and S. Sheppard, American Law in a Global Perspective:
The Basics (NewYork: OUP, 2005), 42^49.
552 JICJ 3 (2005),539^561
be classified under Article 7 or 8. It might also be an act of genocide, as
discussed in the first half of this paper.
For all its simplicity, however, the crime of killing is much more complicated
than the commentaries to the Rome Statute assume and it will be on
this terrain that we will find ample arguments to fend off undisciplined
prosecution.We will discuss three issues that require attention.
A. The Required Intention
Even apart from the issues of collective and individual intention that trouble
the law of genocide, the difficulty is understanding whether indirect killings
are subject to punishment. Indirect killings are those that are not the object of
the actor’s intention. Consider the Report’s finding that ‘those who planned
and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from
their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare’ (x 640).
If this is true (and it is a very significant admission), there is much more
in doubt than just the charge of genocide. As described in this admission by
the Report, the intention to kill is indirect rather than direct. The deaths are
a side effect of a military project. Under these circumstances, we have our
doubts as to whether the killing is properly characterized as either a ‘wilful
killing’ or ‘murder’. In x 180, the Report claims that the required mens rea for
the offence of murder as a crime against humanity is ‘the criminal intent or
recklessness required for the underlying crime’.
There are at least three convincing reasons why this claim in the Report is
false, at least with regard to the punishability of reckless killing. First, Article
30 of the Statute explicitly limits the permissibly recognized culpability states
to intention and knowledge ‘unless otherwise provided’. Every criminal lawyer
knows that ‘intention and knowledge’ implies the exclusion of recklessness and
negligence. No one claims that Articles 7 and 8, defining war crimes and
crimes against humanity, are cases where a lesser mental state is ‘otherwise
provided’. The only provision that does so provide, so far as we know, is
Article 28, which recognizes command responsibility on the basis of negligent
supervision of subordinates in the field. It follows that recklessness cannot
legally be a basis for liability for a crime against humanity or a war crime.
Secondly, the terms ‘murder’ (Article 7) and ‘wilful killing’ (Article 8) clearly
imply that recklessness alone cannot be sufficient for liability. The term
‘murder’, as contrasted with ‘manslaughter’, refers to the most heinous degree
of criminal homicide. It is the same as referring to Mord in German or assasinat
in French. The Rome Statute did not pick the most heinous version of criminal
homicide by accident. The point is to restrict liability to the cases most
deserving of punishment. According to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on The Law of Treaties, the terms of treaties must be interpreted in light of
their ‘ordinary meaning’.With regard to a legal term with a fixed understand-
ing in the domestic legal systems of the world, the ordinary meaning is
obviously settled.
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In common-law systems, recklessness is almost never sufficient for murder.
The Model Penal Code requires, in addition to recklessness, ‘circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life’ (x 210.2(1)(b)).
The common-law term for this degree of indifference to human life was
captured by the metaphor of an ‘abandoned and malignant heart’. There is
simply no warrant to reduce murder to a simple crime of recklessness.
Thirdly, even if there were liability for reckless homicide under the
Rome Statute, we could hardly apply the provision because there is no firm
understanding of what the term means. The Rome Statute does not define the
term and there is an enormous confusion in the literature about its meaning.
The English and the Americans mean something totally different when they
refer to reckless killing.16 Continental Europeans have no precise equivalent
because they typically divide all criminal liability into only two categories:
dolus (intention) and culpa (negligence). The appeal of recklessness to common
lawyers is that it provides a middle station between dolus and culpa. If there
were to be a translation of the Model Penal Code’s definition of ‘recklessness’
into German, the proper term would be bewusste Fahrlasskigkeit (conscious
negligence).
Professor Cassese writes that ‘recklessness’ means the same thing as dolus
eventualis, but this is not correct.17 The term ‘dolus eventualis’ is used in
the Continental literature to describe the borderland of intentional killing.
Recklessness focuses on the risk that the perpetrator is willing to take, but
dolus eventualis is about the actor’s attitude, regardless of the risk of harm.
The punishable attitude, as defined in the German literature and case law, is
one of approval and identification with the evil result. If the purpose of an
armed band is to rid an area of potential military opponents and they know
that some people will die as a result, their attitude is not necessarily dolus
eventualis. Their killing is dolus only if they realize that specific people will
die, approve and desire this result in their hearts, and decide to continue with
their action.18 If the test were reckless killing, the emphasis would be on
the gravity of the risk and the military benefits of the operation. Whether
this is the situation of the alleged killing in Darfur would be a question of
fact, to be resolved at trial. But the Trial Chamber should not even reach
that question because there is no basis for the claim that either murder by
recklessness or murder by dolus eventualis is punished under the Rome Statute.
The analysis of ‘wilful killing’ of a civilian under Article 8 is even more
straightforward. The term ‘wilful’ unambiguously applies only to these actions
that represent the actor’s total commitment of purpose. In American legal
English, there is little doubt that the term is even more restrictive than
16 Compare Model Penal Code, x 2.02(2)(c) with A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd edn,
Oxford: OUP, 1999), 183^191.
17 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 168.
18 On the meaning of dolus eventualis in the continental literature, see G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law (1978) (NewYork: OUP, 2000), 445^449.
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‘intention’. There are many cases in American courts where the term ‘wilful’ is
read to require ‘consciousness of wrongdoing’ as a condition of liability.19
The technical meaning of ‘wilful’ appears to be lost on the community of
international lawyers. The translations of the Rome Statute into French and
Spanish routinely equate the term with ‘intentional’. To our dismay, William
Fenrick writes in the Commentary edited by Otto Triffterer that ‘wilful killing’
includes reckless killing and then defines recklessness more broadly than
would be tolerable in an American courtroom (as roughly the equivalent of
‘foreseeable’).20
It is time that criminal lawyers claim their proper place in the interpretation
and application of the Rome Statute. The proper place to begin is with the
analysis of the criteria of culpability.
B. The Impact of Customary International Law
In most cases of attacks on civilians, the action is not a direct or intentional
killing of a specific person, but rather a military operation that entails severe
collateral or indirect damage to civilians or civilian objects. An attack is
prohibited when the collateral harm is excessive relative to the military
objective. The language of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute is the key
provision: ‘Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects . . .which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated’ is a war crime. According to
this provision, the attack must be intentional ‘in the knowledge’ of excessive
collateral harm to civilians. Even if this provision is considered sufficiently
precise to constitute a norm of criminal law, the Commission of Inquiry
goes too far in seeking to apply it to the circumstances of Darfur.
Section 259 of the Report seeks to restrict the possibility of launching
attacks that endanger civilians by imposing certain rules said to be derived
from ‘customary international law’ (CIL). For example, commanders may not
attack unless they give ‘effective advance warning’. There are many recognized
exceptions to this rule but it is troubling that the rule is even suggested as
a supplementary requirement for testing the legality of attacks on areas
that include civilians.21
Note the way customary international law is used in the Commission’s
analysis. The point is not to generate an additional defence or ‘ground for
excluding criminal responsibility’ according to Article 31(3), which would be
19 See, e.g. United States v.Wallace, 40 F.Supp. 2d 131 (EDNY 1999).
20 See O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 182.
21 These rules of customary international law appear to be drawn from the 1977 Protocol to the
Geneva Convention, Art. 57.
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a permissible deviation from the statutory rule. Rather, the point is to inculpate
commanders who launch attacks without giving effective warning. Custom
is used here as a means of increasing exposure to criminal liability. This is
illegitimate, we contend, under the principle of legality proclaimed in the
Rome Statute under the maxim of nullum crimen sine lege.
We have three fundamental concerns that lead us vigorously to oppose
the reliance on CIL as means of inculpation in criminal prosecutions, whether
in domestic courts or international courts. The first is the notorious difficulty
of establishing a sufficient consensus to validate a rule as CIL. In domestic
legal systems, where there is constant interaction among individuals
encountering each other in public places, many customs do in fact develop.
Men hold doors open for women (or at least used to do so). Men take off their
hats in church and put on some head covering in a synagogue or mosque.
People shake hands by using their right hands. These are trivial examples
of customs that have become customary rules. They are in fact a matter of
etiquette rather than the kinds of issues on which laws would be passed.
But one could imagine more serious customary practice, say, the practice of
tipping in the United States. There are fairly rigorous rules about when to tip
and how much. You could imagine a society in which the same rules applied
to services provided by the police or medical personnel in hospitals.
Customary law begins as a customary practice and then ripens into a
binding rule when those who follow the rule begin to regard the practice
as binding on them. Jewish law is quite familiar with this phenomenon.
Men started wearing skullcaps when they prayed and this custom eventually
became binding. It became customary Jewish law. As H. L. A. Hart explains,
these rules become binding because the actions are done ‘as a law’ and,
in the course, become binding because they are done ‘because of the law’.22
There is no doubt that something similar occurs in international law, even
though the interaction of states and their representatives is minimal compared
to modern urban societies. Yet, when the practice of states does converge,
and this convergence is sustained by a sense of reciprocal obligation, we can
speak of CIL. The classic example is the recognition of the three-mile limit
as a binding rule of international law. The problem generally, however,
is that there is almost never the kind of convergence of state practice
that would be parallel to the examples we have given of customary rules in
domestic culture.
In the last several decades, CIL has taken on an entirely different meaning.
Now, CIL seems to mean whatever states declare to be their fundamental value
aspirations, whether these value commitments are honoured in the breach
or not. This new sense of CIL is evident in the American Law Institute’s 1987
Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States
Article 702, which declares a number of human rights to be part of CIL and
binding on all states, whether they have consented or not. This ‘wish list’ of
22 H.L.A. Hart,The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 124^125.
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human rights obligations, if it has meaning at all, acquires its force from
the pious pronouncement of states that certain egregious abuses constitute
violations of international law. Of course, the list includes primarily those
abuses that were common in the 20th centuryracial discrimination, forced
disappearances and torture. It is understandable that the pious leaders of the
Westmany of whom indulged in these practices in the recent pastwould
declare them to be peremptory rules of CIL. Unfortunately, the piety of theWest
cannot coherently be considered a source of law.
A good example is the prohibition against murder, which is on the ‘wish list’
of the Restatement. There is certainly no convergence among citizens not
to engage in murder. States themselves often engage in the mass murder of
racial, ethnic and political enemies. This is alleged to have occurred in Darfur.
Where, then, is the convergence of behaviour necessary to establish a rule
of customary law? The fundamental paradox of all criminal law is that we
would not be interested in repressive and punitive measures unless criminal
deviations from the rule threatened our well-being. There must be enough
crime to make the apparatus of criminal law a worthwhile expense. If that is
the case, then surely there is no customary law of abstaining from criminal
behaviour. By its very nature, criminal law does not conform to those fields
where customary law is possible.
Perhaps the advocates of CIL are content with saying that states everywhere
concur in prohibiting a certain harmful activity, such as murder. Of course,
an authoritative legislative norm remains valid, even if it is widely breached.
But though every state might have a similar prohibition, they are all indepen-
dent of their neighbours. There is no reciprocal obligation not to murder.
Parallel but independent actions cannot establish a rule of customary law.
Suppose that in every house in the community, the owners independently
decided not to lock their doors at night. No one knew that others were doing
the same thing. Under the circumstances, their unknowing convergence
would not constitute a rule of customary law.
When the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry informs us
that certain duties are incumbent on commanders as CIL, we have to wonder
whether the drafters mean to refer to CIL in the traditional sense, implying
actual convergence coupled with a sense of reciprocal obligation, or the
modern sense expressed in the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law.
Either way, we contend, the use of CIL in criminal proceedings would be
objectionable.
Imagine a place where tipping is the standard practice but an eccentric
refuses to tip. The deprived waiter, taxi-driver or police officer may be able
to sue the deviant eccentric for compensation, but a criminal prosecution
would be out of the question. No prosecutor could stand up in court, anywhere
in the worldat least not in a modern legal systemand defend his charge
solely on the ground that it violated customary law.
Despite the clarity of these points, it is not easy to convince international
lawyers that invoking CIL in criminal cases violates the principle of legality.
We understand that international lawyers regard customary law as the
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supreme form of binding laweven more binding than treatiesbecause it
applies to those who refuse to sign the treaty. Yet, there is an obvious break-
down of legal thought when the international lawyers invoke CIL instead
of treaty authority as a basis for inculpating criminal suspects. They know
they cannot make up new crimes, such as terrorism or the genocide of
political opponents, that are not included in the defined ‘jurisdiction’ of the
ICC under Article 5, but, for some odd reason, the drafters of the Report
of the Commission think they can impose customary rules in defining the
scope of the charge of ‘intentionally launching an attack’ in the knowledge
that the collateral will be excessive. This is a totally erroneous deviation
from the rule of law. The Rome Statute must be applied as it is written,
without additional constraints that supposedly emanate from customary
international law.
A third factor of concern to us bears on this conclusion: the necessity, for
the sake of legality, of distancing the law of the ICC from prior international
instruments that pervasively use the phrase ‘law and customs of war’. It is
hard to know when this phrase came into currency. Francis Lieber did not
use it in 1863.23 Its first appearance may have been in the Hague Conventions.
The 1899 Convention is even entitled ‘Laws and Customs of War on Land’.
The basic point of the Hague Conventions is that the signatories agreed to
abide by the customs, as well as the laws of war. Then, the phrase ‘laws and
customs of war’ enters the lexicon by becoming one of the four conditions
in the famous definition of belligerency in Article 1 to the Convention Annex.
If a fighter does not abide by the custom of war, he or she loses the privilege
of being a belligerent and cannot qualify for POWstatus if captured. The result
is that he or she is treated as an ‘unlawful combatant’ under the Quirin test.24
The phrase ‘laws and customs of war’ played an important role in the
jurisprudence of the ICTY. For example, the Furundz ija decision analyses
several charges in violation of the ‘laws and customs’ of war and expresses no
qualms about identifying torture as violation of CIL.25 The phrase ‘laws and
customs of war’ also appears in the Rome Statute. Without prejudice to an
analysis of the phrase’s proper meaning in the ICTY, we have found that the
phrase has no particular meaning in the Rome Statute and it most definitely
does not support the inclusion of inculpatory restrictions on the basis of CIL.
The phrase is used in the chapeaus of Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) as a general
introduction to the specifically enumerated war crimes in those two divisions.
The word ‘custom’ appears nowhere else in the Statute, and the phrase
‘customary international law’ is absent entirely.
23 General Orders Number 100. Lieber uses the word ‘custom’ precisely once in a non-legal
proposition, Art. 115 (‘It is customary to designate by certain flags (usually yellow) the
hospitals in places which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may avoid firing on them’).
24 United States v. Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942).
25 Judgment, Furundz ija (IT-95^17-A), Appeals Chamber, 21 July 2000.
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The provision that we have been discussingnamely Article 8(2)(b)(iv) on
intentionally launching an attack with knowledge of excessive collateral
damageis included under this general heading of ‘laws and customs of
war’. This provides us with some information, but not much. It is like finding
the crime against money laundering classified under the heading ‘organized
crime’. This classificatory information has little if no bearing on the interpreta-
tion of the statute. Annex Article I to the 1907 Convention famously enumer-
ates four conditions for qualifying as a combatant. It is hardly a warrant
for treating CIL as an additional source of criminal prohibitions under the
Rome Statute.
To sum up, customary international law has no role in international
criminal law, except perhaps to increase the options for the defence. To use
custom to enhance the prospects of conviction is to violate the fundamental
assumptions of modern criminal law. ‘Customary law’ is anathema in the
criminal courts of every civilized society. The reason for legislation is to drive
custom from the system and to create a regime based on rules and standards
declared publicly, in advance, by a competent authority. The Rome Statute
represents public standards of that sort but the rules of customary inter-
national lawwhether real or imagineddo not.
If the Report had grounded its restrictions in the 1977 Protocol to the
Geneva Convention or the Hague Convention of 1907, the problem of legality
would be more subtle. According to Article 21(1)(b), the Court may apply
‘applicable treaties’ as a source of law. It is hard to know what this means.
The other treaties in question are not designed to generate criminal sanctions.
They do not speak directly to individuals as addressees of the norms.Whether
they are ‘applicable’ or not is contestable. While Article 21 might arguably
admit these treaties as a source of law, it does not ever suggest the applicability
of CIL. Referring to the general principles of international and national law
in Article 21(1)(c) might confuse some into thinking that this is a covert
reference to CIL. But it is clearly not. The general principles of criminal law as
developed in American and German law are not customary rules. Consider the
general principles of ‘no liability without fault’ and the distinction between
justification and excuse.26 They are defended as binding because they are
normatively correctnot because they are conventionally accepted. Leading
scholars have always advocated innovations in the basic principles of law
before the courts and the public adopted their teachings. Also, to be sure, one
of the most basic principles of national law that should be recognized under
Article 21(1)(c) is that we do not punish on the basis of customary law.
C. The Problem of Proportionality
The heart of the case against commanders for launching attacks against
areas that include civilian inhabitants is the issue of excessive harm relative
26 See the comparative analysis of these principles in Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 18.
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‘to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’. The Report
says that this is a ‘subjective standard’ (x 260). It is not clear what the authors
meanperhaps that ‘excess’ is in the eye of the beholder, including the
subjective perceptions of commanders in the field.27 If that is the case, no
one could be guilty under the Rome Statute. We suspect the authors mean
the standard is not very precise, which raises issues of legality rather than
excessive deference to the perceptions of potential offenders.
This topic remains regrettably under-theorized. So far as we can tell, there
is no analysis of the issue of proportionality either in the Triffterer
Commentary28 or in Cassese’s leading text, International Criminal Law.29 The
deficit in theory adds to the deficit in legality, for the ICC is likely to think
about proportionality as though it were a strict matter of balancing the costs
and benefits of the attack. This approach is suggested in the Report (x 260),
which conditions proportionality on ‘a balancing between the expectation
and anticipation of military gain and the actual loss of civilian life or
destruction of civilian objects’. This means that if, on balance, the attack
generates more harm than military gain, it is illegal. This way of thinking
about proportionality is deleterious for the defence. It is a consequence of
not understanding the moral foundations of the law of war in the Catholic
doctrine of double effect.30
The prohibition against killing civilians and the rule against disproportion-
ate harm are both rooted in the theological doctrine that absolutely prohibits
the killing of innocent people (in the context of war, civilians), but which
permits killing if the purpose is sound. Even in cases in which killing is
permitted, however, the rule against disproportionate side effects applies.
The problem is figuring out which of the many standards of proportionality
apply in this situation.31 There is good reason to think that ‘excessive’ or
‘disproportionate’ means the same thing in this context, as it does in self-
defence cases where the legitimate defensive purpose permits killing as a
side effect to the legitimate purpose of warding off the attack. The rule of
proportionality will limit the right to prevent the attack where the collateral
harm is clearly disproportionate to the defensive interest.You cannot kill 1,000
people in order to save one person from assault. In these extreme cases, the use
of force is clearly out of bounds. The same is true, we believe, for the standard
of excessive harm in the Rome Statute. It should only lead to conviction
27 That this is the meaning is suggested by the later statement that the subjective standard
‘must be applied in good faith’ (xx160).
28 See Commentary, supra note 20, at 197 (superficial discussion of Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)).
29 See Cassese, supra note 17. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is mentioned on pages 60 and 165 but there is
no discussion of proportionality in either place. The index does not contain any apparent
reference to the concept.
30 This doctrine is widely discussed in the philosophical literature. See, e.g. M. Walzer, Just
and UnjustWars (3rd edn, NewYork: Basic Books, 2000), 152^159.
31 These various standards are discussed in the forthcoming book by G.P. Fletcher, Justice in
the Face of Enemy Fire (NewYork: OUP, 2006).
560 JICJ 3 (2005),539^561
in cases of extreme disproportion. It is not enough that the costs outweigh
the benefits; the harm must be grossly and obviously excessive relative to
the military purpose.32 In x 260, the Report reaches essentially the same
conclusion (‘the prohibition of the most glaringly disproportionate injuries
to civilians’). But it would be preferable if the Report had analysed this
issue properly in its theoretical context. We are concerned that the predicted
limitation to the ‘most glaringly disproportionate injuries to civilians’ is
a consequence of conceding, not entirely correctly, that the standard is
‘subjective’ rather than properly analysing why the disproportionate harm
is at the extreme end of the spectrum.
4. The USA and the ICC
Sensitivity to these conceptual confusions will only grow in importance as
the ICC moves from an academic and diplomatic exercise to a legal reality.
The US decision to abstain from the Security Council referralinstead
of exercising its veto, as many had expectedensures at least a limited
future for the ICC.
The official US position has always been an objection to an international
court that would exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals from countries
not signatories of the Rome Statute. US diplomats make frequent reference to
the Rome Statute’s Article 124 and its opt-out provisions for Rome Statute
parties, arguing that it would be absurd to give parties who have agreed to
the Rome framework greater exemptions than those who never agreed to it in
the first place. Putting aside for the moment the obvious rationale for giving
greater opt-out protections to signatoriescreating a clear incentive to sign
the treatythe US position need not stop the Court from becoming a reality.
The US abstention over the Darfur referrals indicates that the US will not
push their opposition to the point of blocking all ICC referralsas many UN
observers had anticipatedbut will instead threaten vetoes in order to receive
specific assurances that US nationals will be excluded from the Security
Council referrals and exempted from the Court’s jurisdiction. The ICC will
be allowed to continue its work so long as US nationals remain at arm’s
length from the reach of international criminal justice.
The American government might even become more supportive of the
Court if political observers witnessed growing sensitivity to the rights and
interests of the accused. The more the ICC becomes like a real criminal court,
operating under the rule of law, the more American politicians are likely
to shelve their fears of politicized prosecution and support the ICC as an
important instrument of international peace and harmony.
32 See G. Werle, Vo« lkerstrafrecht (Tu« bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), n. 996, at 377 (‘the attack
is permissible only if the civilian collateral damage is not disproportionately high [nicht
unagemessen hoch] relative to the gain achieved by the military attack’).
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